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A BLESSED UNION: TECHNOLOGY EXPANDING
PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS EXEMPTED BY
MASSACHUSETTS'S SPOUSAL
DISQUALIFICATION RULE TO VOICEMAIL
MESSAGES
I. INTRODUCTION
Marital privilege is at the foundation of western legal
jurisprudence.' Resting on antiquated values and status of marriage, the
2
marital privilege can conflict with the pursuit of justice. It continues,
however, to hold a place within the United States justice system.3
The scope of spousal communication has evolved far beyond the
bedroom conversations between a husband and wife.4 New technology
allows spouses to communicate via email, cellular phone, Skype, text
messages, and many other innovative methods.
Courts frequently are
confronted with novel methods of communication that do not fall within
traditional definitions established by statute or common law. 6

1 See

Newell v. State, 49 So.3d 66, 70-72 (Miss. 2010) (exploring extension of marital

privileges to cellular telephones).
2 Naomi Harlin Goodno, Protecting "Any Child": The Use of the Confidential-MaritalCommunications Privilege in Child-Molestation Cases, 59 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 8 n.54 (2010)
("Evidence scholars have offered four historical bases for the common law view that spouses
were not competent witnesses for or against each other: (1) The common law unity of husband
and wife. Upon marriage, the wife lost her separate identity, and the husband and wife became a
legal unity, represented by the husband. Only he could sue or be sued. If the wife had an action,
it had to be brought in the husband's name. Since parties were incompetent as witnesses, the
husband could not testify. Therefore neither could his alter ego, his wife. (2) The marital identity
of interest. Even apart from the spouses' legal identity, their interest in the outcome of any
lawsuit would be the same. Hence, the rationale for the party's incompetency applied equally to
the party's spouse. (3) The assumed bias of affection. Because of the spouses' intimate
relationship and strong feelings for each other, their testimony was deemed incredible. (4) Public
policy. There might be interference with marital harmony if the wife could be called to give
unfavorable testimony against her husband. Even if the wife gave favorable testimony on direct
examination, on cross-examination she may be required to give damaging testimony." (quoting
RONALD CARLSON, ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF
SCIENCE AND STATUTES 168 (4th ed. 1997))).
3 See Newell, 49 So.3d at 70-72 (exploring extension of marital privileges to cellular
telephones).
4 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494-95 (2014) (expanding reasonable expectation
of privacy to cellular phones).
5 See id. (expanding reasonable expectation of privacy to cellular phones).
6 See id. at 2494-95 (expanding reasonable expectation of privacy to cellular phones).
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In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court hinted at a new privacy
argument regarding marital conversations made over cellular phones. 8
While mainly dicta, the Court made a compelling argument that the new
era of "smart phones" means a wealth of personal information at one's
fingertips. 9 This dicta, coupled with a recent case in Mississippi, presents a
persuasive argument for extending the confidential communications marital
privilege to voicemails on cellular phones. 10
This piece explores the Massachusetts definition of the confidential
marital communication privilege and its applicability to voicemail
messages.1 In Part II, I explore the historical development of confidential
marital communications from its medieval roots to the present. 12 Part III
focuses the historical development on the rise of Massachusetts'
evidentiary guidelines and the Commonwealth's use of marital privileges. 3
Part IV discusses the Massachusetts' spousal disqualification rule regarding
private communications and the requisite required elements. 14 Part V
discusses the dramatic advances in communication technology, the recent
cases concerning the Stored Communications Act, and the impact of Riley
and Newell v. State15 on privacy argument. 16 Finally, Part VI discusses this
new concept is applicable to Massachusetts and how to apply the
confidential marital
communications privilege to voicemails through
1
existing case law. 7
II. HISTORY OF MARITAL PRIVILEGE
Martial privilege can be placed into two categories: adverse
spousal testimony and confidential marital communications. 18 Adverse
spousal testimony privilege permits the witness-spouse to refuse to testify

7 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
8

See id. at 2494-95 (expanding reasonable expectation of privacy to cellular phones).

See id. (expanding reasonable expectation of privacy to cellular phones).
10 See Newell, 49 So.3d at 70-72 (exploring extension of marital privileges to cellular
telephones).
11 See infra Part VI (applying marital privilege to voicemails).
12 See infra Part II (discussing history of marital privilege).
13 See infra Part III (discussing history of Massachusetts Guide to Evidence).
14 See infra Part IV (discussing the elements of spousal disqualification rules).
15 49 So.3d 66 (Miss. 2010).
16 See infra Part IV (discussing privacy cell phones).
17 See infra Part VI (applying marital privilege to voicemails).
is See United States v. Breton, 740 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2014) (discussing the two types of
marital privilege); Goodno, supra note 2, at 3 (discussing comparison between two branches of
martial privilege).
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adversely against his or her spouse.1 9 Confidential marital communication
privilege allows either spouse to prevent his or her spouse from testifying
to the confidential communications during the marriage.20 Courts and
scholars believe both categories have evolved from the medieval
disqualification rule.21
A marital privilege was first mentioned in a civil case in the
sixteenth century in England.2 2 According to medieval jurisprudence,
husband and wife were viewed as one person and, therefore, a wife was not
allowed to testify for or against her husband. 23 Legally, the wife did not
have an identity separate from her husband, which would render her
testimony useless, as she would be testifying against herself. 24 This
jurisprudence created the spousal disqualification rule. 25 According to

19 See Breton, 740 F.3d at 9-10 (discussing the two types of marital privilege).
20 Id.
21 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1980) (explaining common medieval
jurisprudence that led to two marital privileges); Goodno, supra note 2, at 8 n.54 ("Evidence
scholars have offered four historical bases for the common law view that spouses were not
competent witnesses for or against each other: (1) The common law unity of husband and wife.
Upon marriage, the wife lost her separate identity, and the husband and wife became a legal unity,
represented by the husband. Only he could sue or be sued. If the wife had an action, it had to be
brought in the husband's name. Since parties were incompetent as witnesses, the husband could
not testify. Therefore neither could his alter ego, his wife. (2) The marital identity of interest.
Even apart from the spouses' legal identity, their interest in the outcome of any lawsuit would be
the same. Hence, the rationale for the party's incompetency applied equally to the party's spouse.
(3) The assumed bias of affection. Because of the spouses' intimate relationship and strong
feelings for each other, their testimony was deemed incredible. (4) Publicpolicy. There might be
interference with marital harmony if the wife could be called to give unfavorable testimony
against her husband. Even if the wife gave favorable testimony on direct examination, on crossexamination she may be required to give damaging testimony." (quoting RONALD CARLSON ET
AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 168 (4th ed.
1997))); see also Developments in the Law Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1450, 1564 (1985) [hereinafter "Developments in the Law"] (linking development of adverse
testimonial privilege to disqualification rule).
22 See Bent v. Allot, 21 Eng. Rep. 50, 50 (Ch. 1579-1580) (regarding request to examine
defendant's wife after defendant attempted to introduce wife's testimony). The precedent created
by this case was that a wife could not be induced to testify against her husband. Id.; see Milton C.
Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L. REV. 2045, 2054 n.44
(1995) (citing cases that recognized husband's right to prevent wife from testifying against him).
23 See Goodno, supra note 2, at 8 n.54 (discussing background of marital privileged).
24 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44 (citing to spousal disqualification rule). According
to
Trammel, the logic behind the prohibition is based on the legal principle that "an accused was not
permitted to testify on his own behalf because of his interest in the proceeding" and the husband
was the only one with a legal existence. Id. The wife derived her legal existence from the
husband, thus utilizing his legal existence to testify. Id. If she had to borrow the husband's
existence to testify, legally she was considered the husband testifying against himself, which was
not legally permissible. Id.
25 See Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 1564 (describing evolution of
medieval
jurisprudence regarding disqualification rule).
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another theory adverse testimonial privilege arose independently and was
well established in judicial decisions and legal commentary by the sixteen
century. 26 Bent v. Allot,27 citing adverse testimonial privilege, was
mentioned nearly forty-eight years before the first mention of spousal
disqualification. 21
The Supreme Court did not explicitly recognize the spousal
disqualification rule until 1839.29
In Stein v. Bowman,30 the Court
recognized that a wife was unable to testify for or against her husband
because she served as a legal extension of him.3 1 However, this ruling
became outdated when Congress passed legislation in 1878 that
empowered a defendant to testify on his own behalf in a criminal case.32
Enactment of the legislation made it more difficult to prove a wife, as an
extension of her husband, was incompetent to testify on her husband's
behalf if her husband was able to testify for himself.3 3 Thus, in 1933 the
spousal disqualification rule was abolished.3 4
Without the spousal

26

See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §2227, 211 (J.

McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (exploring history of adverse testimonial privilege). Wigmore
theorizes that the privilege arose from a "legal and social acceptance" of husbands as the master
of the home. Id. In the late sixteenth century, a wife or a servant who hanned the "master" could
be tried for petit treason. Id.If a wife was permitted to testify against her husband, and indirectly
be the cause for her husband's death, then she hanned the "master." Id. By the mid seventeenth
century this privilege was cited in judicial decisions and legal commentary. Id.
27 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (Ch. 1580).
28 See Regan, supra note 22, at 2055 n.46 (discussing Bent v. Allot). Bent
referenced
Edward Coke's statement that, "a wife cannot be produced either against or for her husband, quia
sunt duae animae, in came una [because they are two souls in one body], and it might be a cause
of implacable discord and dissention between husband & the wife." ILd.
(citing EDWARD COKE,
THE COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON § 6b (5th ed. 1656); see Davis v. Dinwoody, 4 Term Rep.
678, 679, 100 Eng. Rep. 1241, 1241 (K.B. 1792) ("[B]eing so nearly connected, [spouses] are
supposed to have such a bias upon their minds that they are not to be permitted to give evidence
either for or against each other.").
29 See Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 222 (1839) ("[T]he wife and the husband have been
viewed, in this respect, as having a right to protection from a disclosure, on the same principle as
an attorney is protected from a disclosure of the facts communicated to him by his client.").
30 38 U.S. 209 (1839).
31 See id.
(explaining holding of the case in the context of marital privilege).
32 See 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (2012) ("In trial of all persons charged with the commission of
offenses against the United States and in all proceedings in courts martial and courts of inquiry in
any State, District, Possession or Territory, the person charged shall, at his own request, be a
competent witness.").
33 See Goodno, supra note 2, at 7 (reflecting on effects of legislation). The courts did not
separate the legal entity of the husband and wife, but women were empowered to serve as
witnesses in judicial proceedings. Id.
34 See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 387 (1933) ("Nor can the exclusion of the wife's
testimony, in the face of the broad and liberal extension of the rules in respect of the competency
of witnesses generally, be any longer justified, if it ever was justified, on any ground of public
policy."). The Court held the witness-spouse could testify on behalf of the defendant- spouse, but
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disqualification rule in play, adverse testimonial privilege and confidential
communications3 5privilege were able to evolve into the privileges we
recognize today.
Following 1933, Hawkins v. United States3 6 explicitly outlined the
adverse testimonial privilege. 3 The Supreme Court held that both spouses
held the privilege to bar adverse testimony of the other spouse to "foster
family peace." 38 This rule remained in place until the Court's decision in
Trammel v. United States,39 which held that the witness-spouse alone held
the privilege in criminal proceedings.4 0
On the other hand, the marital communications privilege was not
explicitly utilized until the 1850s.
With the spousal disqualification rule
in place, a wife did not possess a separate legal identity and was forbidden
from testifying against her spouse . 42 In all other cases, the adverse
testimonial privilege could cover attempts to bring in spousal evidence. 3
The marital communications did not come to the forefront until the spousal
45
44
disqualification rule was abolished. In 1934, in Wolfle v. United States,
the Supreme Court recognized the martial communications privilege for the
first time. 46 However, it was not clear who held the power to invoke the
privilege and, even in the latter case of Blau v. United States,a the Court

did not discuss whether one spouse could prevent the other from adversely testifying. Id.
35 Id.
36 358 U.S.

74 (1958).
37 See id. at 78-79 (establishing parameters of adverse testimonial privilege). In Hawkins, the
Court reaffirmed Funk and answered the question of whether one spouse could prevent the other
spouse from adversely testifying. Id. In other words, it defined adverse testimonial privilege. Id.
38 See id. at 77 (exploring policy rationale behind spousal privilege).
39 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
40 See id. at 53 (balancing interests in "marital harmony" with not "unduly burdening
legitimate law enforcement means").
41 See WIGMORE, supra note 26, at 644 (discussing evolution of spousal privilege).
42 See Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 1565 (discussing usage of spousal
disqualification rule). The spousal disqualification rule was the primary rule in place preventing
wives from testifying in legal proceedings until its abolishment in 1933. Id.
43 See Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 1565. The only time the marital
communications privilege was necessary was when the action involved neither spouse as a party
to the case, but the communication remained material to the case outcome. ld.
44 See WIGMORE, supra note 26, at 645 (relating the evolution of marital communications
privilege). After the spousal disqualification rule was abolished, state legislatures felt compelled
to enact protections for marital communications. Id.
45 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
46 See id. at 14 ("[R]egarded [marital communications] as so essential to the preservation of
the marriage relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the administration of justice.");
Goodno, supra note 2, at 9- 10 (discussing impact of Wolfle).
47 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
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avoided the question of invocation.4 8
In conjunction with the common law holdings, state legislatures
and other organizations sought to reform the boundaries of the marital
privilege landscape.49
In 1938, the American Bar Association
recommended that adverse testimonial privilege be abolished, while
maintaining the confidential communications privilege.5 0 The American
Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws quickly followed suit, also
attacking the adverse testimonial privilege.5
However, in 1971, the
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence proposed the Rule 505, which
abolished the confidential
communications privilege in favor of adverse
S• 52
testimonial privilege.
In response, Congress rejected proposed Rule 505
and in favor of the more permissive Rule 501.53 The codification of the
48 See id. at 333 (reaffirming requirements for the privilege without deciding who may

invoke it).
49 See Regan, supra note 22, at 2058-59 (arguing there was movement to provide more
protection for confidential communications than adverse testimonial privilege).
50 See id.(arguing there was movement to provide more protection for confidential
communications than adverse testimonial privilege). Regan describes the extensive protections
instituted by states regarding all manner of confidential communications, such as with marital
counselors, domestic violence counselors, and social workers. ld.at 2057.
51 See id. at 2058-59 (stating American Law Institute rejected argument that "adverse
testimony preserved marital harmony"); see also UNWi. R. EvD. 23(2) cmt. (1953) (stating
National Conference of Commissioners recommended elimination of adverse testimony but
retention of communication privilege).
52 See Regan, supra note 22, at 2058-59 (stating American Law Institute rejected argument
that "adverse testimony preserved marital harmony"). The Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence originally met and drafted a preliminary draft in 1969. See 46 F.R.D. 161, 263-66
(1969) (discussing general rule of marital privilege). The logic behind not including marital
communications in the privilege was that the committee felt the traditional justifications for
having a marital privilege were not relevant to the discussion of marital communications. ld. at
264. The committee found the "prevention of marital dissensiof' and "repugnancy of requiring a
person to condemn or be condemned by his spouse" as the key rationales for developing this
privilege. Id. A privilege regarding marital communications would not deter these issues since
the committee felt parties are likely unaware that this privilege exists. Id. at 264-65. Finally,
they contrasted marital communication with other communication privileges, such as attorneyclient privilege and doctor-patient privilege, where because one professional is privy to the
communication he or she can inform the other of the existence of the privilege before it becomes
effective, ld.at 265. The concern was married couples did not have the requisite knowledge of
the privilege before it became effective. Id. Then, in 1972, the same committee proposed
revisions to the Rule 505. 51 F.R.D. 315, 369-71 (1971).
53 See Regan, supra note 22 at 2058-59 (discussing Congress' preference for Rule 501); see
also Mika K. Story, Twenty-First Century Pillow-Talk: Applicability of the Marital
Communications to Electronic Mail, 58 S.C. L. REV. 275, 280 (2006) (noting Congress also
rejected proposal to abolish confidential communication privilege).
[T]he meaning of the Rule (made entirely clear in the Advisory Committee's
comments) is that, however intimate, however private, however embarrassing may be
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federal rules of evidence was delayed for two years partly because of the
strong condemnation against the proposed Rule 505.5 4 Thus, Rule 501 was
enacted instead, so that marital privileges could be left to the discretion of
the states. Today, the confidential communications privilege is codified
in forty-nine states and the District of Columbia, reflecting its popularity
even after the codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence.5 6

a disclosure by one spouse to another, or some fact discovered, within the privacies
of marriage, by one spouse about another, that disclosure of fact can be wrung from
the spouse under penalty of being held in contempt of court, if it is thought barely
relevant to the issues in anybody's lawsuit for breach of a contract to sell a carload of
apples ... It seems clear to me that this Rule trenches on the area of marital privacy
so staunchly defended by the Supreme Court.
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Marital and Physician Privileges A Reprint of a Letter to a
Congressman, 1975 DuKE L.J. 45, 47 (1975); see also Goodno, supra note 2, at
11 (discussing Professor Charles Black's letter to Congressman William L. Hungate's
regarding privilege rule).
54 See Goodno, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing opposition to eliminating marital privilege).
After the Judicial Conference approved the Revised Draft of Propose Rules from the Advisory
Committee, the Supreme Court sought the legal community's opinion of this draft. Michael W.
Mullane, Trammel v. United States: Bad History, Bad Policy, and Bad Law, 47 ME. L. REV. 105,
117-18 (1995). Immediately, the United States Justice Department and "conservative" members
of Congress voiced opposition to the wording of the marital privilege. See id. ("Organized
opposition surfaced, notably from the United States Justice Department. Conservative members
of Congress were also upset ....

" (quoting RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE

NINETIES 25 (3rd ed. 1991))). When the Supreme Court sent the revised rules to Congress there
were extensive debates. Id. at 118. Endless committee hearings and floor debates, coupled with a
disparity between the bills of the House and Senate, significantly delayed the enactment of the
federal rules. Id. It was expected that Congress would "reject the entire set of rules" solely over
the marital privilege dispute. Id.
55 See FED. R. EVID. 501 (discussing privileges in general); 120 Cong. Rec. 40, 891 (1094)
(presenting statement of Rep. Hungate).
56 See Story, supra note 53, at 281 (citing ALA. R. EVID. 504(b));505(b); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §
12-2232 (2003); ARK. R. EviD. 504(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 917(a) (West Supp. 2006); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(1)(a)(I) (Supp. 2006); DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 504(b); D.C. CODE § 14-306
(LexisNexis Supp. 2006); FLA. STAT. § 90.504 (West 1999); GA. CODE § 24-5-501(7) (2014);
HAW. R. EVID. 505(b); IDAHO CODE § 9-203(1) (2004); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-801 (West

2003); IND. CODE § 34-46-3-1(4) (LexisNexis 1998); IOWA CODE § 622.9 (West 1999); KAN.
STAT. § 60-428 (2005); Ky. R. EviD. 504(b); LA. CODE EviD. art. 504 (2006); ME. REV. STAT.

tit. 15 § 1315 (1999); MD. CODE CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-105 (LexisNexis 2002); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 233 § 20 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2162(7) (West Supp. 2006); MINN. STAT. §
595.02(a) (West 2000); MISS. R. EVID. 504(b); Mo. STAT. § 546.260 (West 2006); MONT. CODE
§ 26-1-802 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-505 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.295(1)(b)
(LexisNexis 2002); N.H.R. EVID. 504; N.J. STAT. § 2A:84A-22 (West 1994); N.M. STAT. § 38-66(A) (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4502(b) (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57(c)
(2005); N.D.R. EViD. 504(b); OHIO REV. CODE § 2945.42 (LexisNexis 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit.

12, § 2504 (West Supp. 2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.255 (2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5914
(West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-13 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-30 (Supp. 2004); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-13 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-201 (2000); TEx. R. EViD.
504(a)(2); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(1) (2002); VT. R. EVID. 504(b); VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-
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III. HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE
Following the codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court appointed an advisory committee to
explore the codification of evidence rules into law. Headed by Honorable
John E. Fenton, Jr. and Professor Charles M. Burnim of Suffolk University
Law School, the committee drafted proposed rules of evidence to be
reviewed by the Massachusetts Bar Association before its final submission
to the court. 58 The committee cited the Federal Rules of Evidence and
Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence, among other sources, as the
S 59
language's foundation.
In 1980, with the court requesting briefs from a
number of organizations, the Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly published the
full text of the findings with notes from the committee. 60 In all, there was a
relatively positive response to the codification, 61 but on December 30,
1982, the court released an announcement declining to codify the proposed
rules. 62 The court was concerned that codification would restrict the

271.2 (Supp. 2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (West Supp. 2006); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-4
(LexisNexis 2005); Wis. STAT. § 905.05 (West 2000); WYO. STAT. § 1-12-104 (2005))
(discussing purpose of Rule 501).
57 See Jeremiah F. Healy III, Ten Years After: A Reconsideration of the Codification of
Evidence Law in Massachusetts, 15 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 1, 3 (1993) (discussing and citing
codification of Federal Rules of Evidence as impetus behind movement). The advisory
committee was appointed on November 22, 1976. Id.
58 See id. at 3-4 (describing the formation of the committee). The original chairman was the
Honorable A. David Mazzone of the Massachusetts Superior Court, but he was succeeded by the
Honorable John E. Fenton, Jr. when Mazzone was elevated to the federal bench. Id. at 3.
Professor Charles M. Burnim succeeded a member of the committee who passed away. Id.at 4.
These gentlemen led the advisory committee and sought commentary from the legal community
at the annual meeting of the Massachusetts Bar Association while finalizing their draft rules. Id.
The draft was submitted to the Supreme Judicial Court in July of 1980. Id.
59 Healy, supra note 57, at 4. The Federal Rules of Evidence refers to the rules that were
codified, while the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence were rules were not enacted by Congress.
ld.The committee sought to utilize the Federal Rules of Evidence "as a starting point" and would
deviate when there were "reasons of policy or of well-established Massachusetts practice." Id.
60 ld.The Boston Bar Association submitted a 70-page brief that comprehensively discussed
the proposed rules. Ild.
at 12.
61 See id. at 12-13 (discussing reviews of the rules). The author examined the briefs and
responses of interested organizations and found the responses stated that the "codification of
Massachusetts evidence law was sensible, especially if it was modeled on the federal rules ....
Ild.The author felt that the singular issue for these organizations was the "wording of certain
individual rules" not opposition to its enactment. Ild.
62 See id.at 13 (discussing Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision regarding
codification); Jeffrey S. Siegal, Timing Isn 't Everything: Massachusetts'Expansion of the Excited
Utterance Exception in Severe Criminal Cases, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1999) (discussing
codification of Massachusetts' rules of evidence). Many were shocked when the rules were not
codified because there was such a positive response from the legal community. Healy, supra note
57, at 13.
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evolution of the common law evidence already better adapted to
Massachusetts's law and cited the lack of uniformity even in federal
courts. 63 It would not adopt them "at this time., 64 However, the courts,
including the Supreme Judicial Court, continue to cite to these proposed
"rules. 6 5
Finally in 2006, at the request of the Massachusetts Bar
Association, Boston Bar Association, and the Massachusetts Academy of
Trial Attorneys, the Supreme Judicial Court once again selected an
advisory committee to prepare what is now known as the Guide to
Evidence, first published in 2008. 66 While not codified, these "rules" are
considered a reliable compilation of existing evidence standards to be
utilized by the courts and the public. 67 The marital privilege standards are
statutorily enforced and dictated in the Guide to Evidence, 6' but the case
law illuminates the necessary elements of the "rule" regarding the
confidential communications privilege, which is better known as the
spousal disqualification rule in Massachusetts.6 9
IV. ELEMENTS OF MARITAL PRIVILEGE
In Massachusetts, the marital privilege is included in
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 233, section 20 and section 504 of the
Guide to Evidence. Section 504(b)(1) states, "In any proceeding, civil or

63 See Healy, supra note 57, at 14 (explaining rules were "less adapted to the needs of
modern trial practice than current Massachusetts law.").
64 Id. at 14. The Justices saw the "substantial value" of the proposed rules and suggested
there was a place for them in the "continued and historical role of the courts." Id.
65 See Siegal, supra note 62, at 1244 (discussing the "proposed rules"). The proposed rules
are considered an "authoritative source in evidentiary rulings." Id.
66 MassachusettsGuide To Evidence, SUP. JUD. CT. ADVISORY COMM. ON MASS. EVIDENCE

L., iii (2016), http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/guide-to-evidence/massguidetoevidence.pdf
(describing all proposed rules of evidence and corresponding case law).
67 See Siegal, supra note 62, at 1244 (discussing the "proposed rules" as an "authoritative
source" by the trial and appellate courts).
68 See Massachusetts Guide to Evidence, supra note 66, at iii (describing all proposed rules
of evidence and corresponding case law).
69 See infra Part IV (discussing marital privileges in Massachusetts General Laws and Guide
to Evidence).
70 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20 (2016).
First, Except in a proceeding arising out of or involving a contract made by a married
woman with her husband . . . neither husband nor wife shall testify as to private
conversations with the other ...

the other.

[nor] shall be compelled to testify in trial ...

against
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criminal, a witness shall not testify as to private conversations with a
spouse occurring during their marriage. ,,7
From this statement we can
derive the basic elements of the rule: any proceeding civil or criminal,
disqualification versus a privilege, private conversation between the
spouses, and during the marriage 2
A. "In any proceeding, civil or criminal"
This language, which is present in the Guide as well as the
statutory wording, suggests that the privilege is applicable in both civil and
criminal proceedings. v Since the language "any proceeding" precedes the
clause "civil or criminal," the term "civil or criminal" serves merely to
clarify the broader meaning of proceeding.
The legislature intended a
broad application of this privilege across both types of proceedings because
it limited its application through a series of exceptions .

B. Disqualification Versus Privilege
Unlike the adverse testimonial privilege, the spousal
disqualification prevents either spouse from testifying about private
conversations; thus, no one person holds a right to prevent or disclose the
information. 6 Even if both parties are agreeable to revealing the elements
of the private conversation, the rule does not permit it. 7 7 It is important to

ld.
71 See Massachusetts Guide to Evidence, supra note 66, at 70 (describing spousal privilege
general rule and who can claim privilege).
72 See id. (describing spousal privilege general rule and who can claim privilege).
73 See Commonwealth v. Burnham, 887 N.E.2d 222, 225-27 (Mass. 2008) (treating civil and
criminal proceedings together under spousal privilege rule). The court held that since the
wording states "any person may testify in any proceeding" the rule meant to treat both civil and
criminal proceedings alike. Id. The defendant attempted to argue that since there were
exceptions to the rule citing specific civil or criminal proceedings, the whole statute must be read
as distinguishing the treatment between civil or criminal proceedings. ld. The court pointed to
laws involving statutory construction to demonstrate that since the word "proceeding" is used
without limitation, it refers to either proceeding. Id.
74 See id. at 226-27 (applying canons of statutory construction to "proceeding").
75 See id. (applying canons of statutory construction to "proceeding").
76 See Gallagher v. Goldstein, 524 N.E.2d 53, 54 (Mass. 1988) (holding rule applies equally
to both spouses and both can raise it).
77 See id. (discussing evidence of a private conversation).
In one case, the husband
attempting to prove the effects of a head injury, called his own wife as a witness to testify that he
declared he was going to drown himself. See also Commonwealth v. Cronin, 69 N.E. 1065, 1066
(Mass. 1904) (discussing spouse's testimony). This was the only evidence he attempted to
commit suicide before the assault of the plaintiff. Id. However, the court excluded this evidence
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note that the disqualification applies to the content of the conversation, not
the fact that the conversation occurred. 8 So, if the existence of the
conversation is material to the case, it can be introduced as evidence. 79 As
long as neither party objected to the fact of the private conversation
occurred, then it can be "given its full probative value." 8 0
C. Privacy
Privacy is an essential limitation on the conversations permitted
and, therefore, is a preliminary fact for the trial judge to determine.81 In
federal courts the limitation is restricted to those that are confidential, but
the Massachusetts courts take the limitation a step further.8 2 Privacy is
defined as solely in the presence of the husband and wife, and thus there

has been case law considering whether the presence of the spouse's
children eliminates the element of privacy since they could count as a
"third party."83 In those cases, the court has considered the age, proximity,
and understanding of the children, though the courts are not necessarily

as a private conversation between a husband and his wife. ld. While the husband and wife were
willing to share this private conversation, and the testimony would be beneficial to defendant's
case, it had to be excluded because of the absolute bar of the rule. ld.
78 See Goldstein, 524 N.E.2d at 54 ("[T]he statute does not bar evidence as to the fact that a
conversation took place.").
79 See Sampson v. Sampson, 112 N.E. 84, 87 (Mass. 1916) ("It does not exclude from the
realm of evidence proofs of acts designedly induced by those conversations and legitimate
inferences as to the cause of such acts.").
so See Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 N.E.2d 87, 95-96 (Mass. 1978) (noting defendant
making proper objection is entitled to ruling from trial judge). The privilege is a defense that can
be raised, but is considered waived if there is no objection raised. See MacDonald's Case, 178
N.E. 647, 649 (Mass. 1931) (discussing application of privilege).
81 See Freeman v. Freeman, 130 N.E. 220, 222-23 (Mass. 1921) (demonstrating judge
determines whether conversation is private in presence of spouses' daughters). In this case, the
judge properly admitted a marital conversation that occurred in the presence of their nine-year-old
child since the judge determined that the child had "sufficient intelligence at the time to pay
attention, and to understand." ld. at 222. The court decided it was for the judge to determine
whether the element of privacy was met before proceeding with the evidence, ld.
82 See Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) ("[B]etween husband and wife may
sometimes be made in confidence even though in the presence of a third person"); Blau v. United
States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951) (recognizing rule that marital communications are
presumptively confidential); Haddad v. Lockheed Cal. Corp., 720 F.2d 1454, 1456 (9th Cir.
1983) (finding party that introduces communication bears burden of overcoming the presumption
of applying privilege); United States v. Weinberg, 439 F.2d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 1971) (affirming
the holding of Haddad).
83 See Freeman, 130 N.E. at 222 (regarding presence of nine-year-old
child enough to
destroy privacy); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1954) (ruling federally privilege may
be waived if information is conveyed to third party).
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lenient.8 4 Therefore, if a third party overhears such a conversation, there is
no bar on him or her from testifying to the substance?5

D. Conversations with a Spouse
In Massachusetts,
the communication is limited verbal
conversations, not written communications.8 6 However, courts do not

allow "words constituting or accompanying abuse, threats, or assaults"
against the other spouse to be disqualified as confidential conversations

since it is against public policy and would limit the prosecution of domestic
violence cases.17 Further complaints or exclamations regarding pain or
suffering to one's spouse are also not barred.88 There are several
proceedings listed in section 504(b)(2) where the disqualification does not

apply because
the conversation is regarded as material for public policy
89
reasons.
E. During their Marriage
The disqualification only applies during the marriage because this
rule is derived from an interest in preserving marital harmony. 90 Therefore,
any private conversations before or after the spouses were married are not
disqualified.91
However, if the spouse has passed away, the
disqualification survives.92 There is an exception if the declaration of a

84 See Lyon v. Prouty, 28 N.E. 908, 909 (Mass. 1891) (finding conversation was subject

matter child would be interested in and she had sufficient proximity).
85 See Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 388 N.E.2d 658, 661 (Mass. 1979) (holding third parties
in presence of marital conversation are not forbidden from testifying about conversation).
86 See Commonwealth v. Szczuka, 464 N.E.2d 38, 46 n.14 (Mass. 1984) (finding letters from
defendant to wife were properly introduced into evidence).
87 See Commonwealth v.Gillis, 263 N.E.2d 437, 440 (Mass. 1970) (finding disqualification
not meant to cover words of abuse, threats, or assaults).
88 See Commonwealth v. Jardine, 10 N.E. 250, 250-51 (Mass. 1887) (holding wife's presence
while defendant complained of pain and suffering did not exclude testimony).
89 Massachusetts Guide to Evidence, supra note 66, at 70; see, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Burnham, 887 N.E.2d 222, 222-24 (Mass. 2008) (regarding not applying privilege to child abuse
proceedings); Villalta v. Commonwealth, 702 N.E.2d 1148, 1152 (Mass. 1998) (stating child
abuse exception not limited to child of either spouse).
90 See Gallagher v. Goldstein, 524 N.E.2d 54, 54-55 (Mass. 1988) (citing historical
precedence and policy reasons for the rule).
91 See Commonwealth v. Azar, 588 N.E.2d 1352, 1361 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) ("[The marital
disqualification rule] depends upon the existence of the marital relationship at the time of the
conversation.").
92 See Dexter v. Booth, 84 Mass. 559, 559-60 (1861) (holding disqualification still applies
after death of spouse). Plaintiff was a merchant who brought an action against the executor of an
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deceased is admitted as hearsay, was made in good faith, and upon
"personal knowledge." 93
V. PRIVACY OF CELLULAR PHONES
More than any other element, the privacy element has been
attacked the most because of the proliferation and popularity of cellular
phones in our society. 94 Courts regularly face the uncharted, expanding
territory of technology that does not always analogize well with previous
jurisprudence. Some courts attempted to rationalize how the law should
evolve to accept the challenges posed by our technologically savvy society,
while others
refused to delve into the complexities of connectivity and the
95
"cloud.,

Consequently, it came as no surprise that the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider cellular phones in 96the context of Fourth
Amendment protections during a search and seizure.
A. Privacy and the "Third Party Presence"

One of the first, publicized debates regarding privacy and cell
phones was in the context of the National Security Administration's
surveillance of cellular phone metadata. 97 The American Civil Liberties

estate for goods purchased. ld. Plaintiff attempted to have the widow testify to private
conversations with her husband. ld. The court held the "exclusion remains unaffected by his
death" even though the nature of the conversation was not confidential. ld.
93 See Massachusetts Guide to Evidence, supra note 66, at 70 ("This disqualification shall not
apply to: .. .a declaration of a deceased spouse if the court finds that it was made in good faith
and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant."); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 65
(2016) ("In any action or other civil judicial proceeding, a declaration of a deceased person shall
not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay or as private conversation between husband and wife,
as the case may be, if the court finds that it was made in good faith and upon the personal
knowledge of the declarant.").
94 See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30-33 (D.D.C. 2013) (discussing marital
privilege in the context of cell phones).
95 See American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(finding no standing to raise Fourth Amendment challenge); Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 30-33
(affirming had standing to raise Fourth Amendment challenge). While reaching differing
opinions, as noted below, both courts were confronted with arguments by the plaintiff citing to
the radical differences between cellular phones and other items discoverable during a search. See
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 757 (finding no standing to raise Fourth Amendment challenge);
Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 32-33 (affirming standing to raise Fourth Amendment challenge).
96 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480-85 (2014) (holding search of cellular
phone's metadata requires search warrant).
97 See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Verizon Customer Daily, THE
GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-recordsverizon-court-order (revealing mass-collection of telephone records in United States from records
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Union, among others, were concerned that there was little to no oversight
of government organizations that acted in the name of national security. 98
However, other than a general knowledge that such surveillance was in
place, very little concrete evidence was available to the public. 99
Therefore, the initial hurdle for bringing suit in federal court was the issue
of standing. 00 Previously, cases brought before the district courts could
only proceed on the assumption that their calls were being reviewed due to
the existence of the surveillance program.0 1
This all changed when
Edward Snowden, a former NSA contract employee, released
documentation that revealed that the NSA was collecting daily phone
records of Verizon customers and the Government confirmed the
authenticity of the documents 0 2 This assumption was no longer too
attenuated for the justice system to ignore the very real question of privacy,
which led to two highly differing opinions.' ° 3
First, in Klayman v. Obama °4 the court held that due to "nature
and quantity of the information contained in people's telephony metadata"
the public had a "greater expectation of privacy" than before and therefore
the public has the right to be protected from "invasive acts" by the
government. 10 5 Distinguishing from the landmark opinion Smith v.
Maryland,10 6 the court found this decision inapplicable due to the
released by Edward Snowden).
98 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146-47 (finding no standing existed even though plaintiff
claimed communications intercepted).
99 See id. at 1144-45 (discussing limited knowledge of extent of collection).
100 See id. at 1147
("Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it
cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too
speculative for Article III purposes that the injury is certainly impending." (quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2 (1992))).
101 See id.at 1148-49 (discussing government's targeting practice); Kate Vinton, Edward
Snowden Calls Ruling on NSA Mass Surveillance "ExtraordinarilyEncouraging",FORBES, May
8, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2015/05/08/edward-snowden-calls-nsa-masssurveillance-ruling-extraordinarily-encouraging/ (explaining Amnesty case thrown out because it
could not prove it was being spied on).
102 See Greenwald, supra note 97 (recognizing foreign intelligence surveillance court giving
permission to collect telephone metadata from Verizon).
103 See Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 757 (discussing NSA collection provided
standing);
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding had standing due to proof of
NSA collection); Greenwald, supra note 97 (recognizing foreign intelligence surveillance court
giving permission to collect telephone metadata from Verizon).
104 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
105 See id. at 34-36, 41 (summarizing how metadata constitutes a search).
106 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding fourth amendment rights
not violated by installing pen register without warrant). The Supreme Court found a person could
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy for "numbers dialed into a telephone system." Id.at
738. The numbers dialed are sent to the telephone system, a third party, through the switchboards
that convey the call to the recipient. Id. at 742. The court found the reasonable expectation of
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advancement in technology, the breadth of information, and how the
current relationship between law enforcement and these private companies
amounts to a 'joint intelligence -gathering operation., 107 Most of the
argument regarding whether it constituted a search pointed to the ubiquity
of cellular phones as well as their numerous functions, revealing a wealth
of information far beyond its telephone capabilities. 0 8
The court
acknowledged that a phone "reflects a wealth of detail about ...

familial,

political, professional, religious, and sexual associations. ' 09 With such a
device, the court could comprehend why "society views that expectation as
reasonable." 110
In contrast, in American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper,1

the

court found no "reasonable expectation of privacy" because an individual
cannot hold an expectation of privacy when it voluntarily releases the
information to third parties: the telecommunication providers.1 12 When an
individual uses his or her phone, the service provider stores where the call
went to, how long the call lasted, and other information regarding usage."'
These companies are allowed to collect this data because all customers
agree to such conditions when they buy a device. 114 Furthermore, a
customer cannot allege a breach of his or her privacy when he or she
knowingly submitted to such terms. 115 In the court's analysis, it examined
Katz v. United States 116 to determine, "first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy" to ascertain if a search
occurred. 17 The court determined a person could not have an expectation
if he or she already knows that the information is stored and used for the

privacy stopped at the content of the phone call. Id.at 739, 743.
107 See Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 32-34 (distinguishing present case from Smith v.
Maryland).
108 See id. at 33 (distinguishing present case from Smith v. Maryland).
109Id.at 36 (quoting U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012)).
110

Id.

...959 F.Supp.2d 724 (S.D.N.Y 2013).
112 See ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749, 752 (S.D.N.Y 2013) (enforcing Smith v.
Maryland).
113 See id.at 730 (discussing metadata).
114 See id. at 753 (discussing how the concept of metadata has not changed).
115 See id. at 749-50 (reasoning no expectation of privacy when dialing telephone numbers
because company keeps records of numbers).
116 See 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that fourth amendment violations are not limited to
physical intrusions and trespass doctrine).
117

See id. at 361 (Harlan J., concurring) ("[T]he rule that has emerged from prior decisions

is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to

recognize as 'reasonable."').
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company's business records.118 Once that privacy expectation is lost, the
court finds the breadth and type of information from a phone not important
to the analysis of whether or not there was a search.11 9 However, the
Supreme Court acknowledged the notion that a petitioner can have the
expectation to keep the content of the conversation
private even if that does
1 20
not extend to the actual number dialed.
These two cases while exploring the implication of a "reasonable
expectation of privacy," touched upon relevant privacy arguments for
marital privilege. 121 Both acknowledged that the "touchstone" was the
"reasonable expectation" of the public. 122 The public's perception of
phones has dramatically changed over the decades, thus requiring a
reevaluation of the court's consideration of "reasonableness., 123 There
appeared to be a consensus that the content of the data would implicate
legitimate privacy concerns.124

B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
In 2014, arguments surrounding a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" came to the forefront when the Supreme Court considered the case
of Riley v. California.125

That case consisted of two separate incidents

126
regarding a cell phone seized off the defendants' person during a search.
In the first incident, a cell phone was seized off of petitioner David Riley
during an arrest for possession of concealed and loaded firearms in his
vehicle.1 27 In the second incident, two cellular phones were seized off of

118 See Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 750 (finding no privacy expectations for customers).
119See id. at 752 (asserting unprotected information does not turn make it Constitutional
right).
120 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (rejecting notion that numbers called
are private). Also, in Clapper, the discussion does not broach the concept of content versus
identification because the query initially
only starts
with the telephone number itself.
Clapper,
959 F. Supp. 2d at 740-41.
121 See Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 756-57 (emphasizing importance of reasonableness with
Fourth Amendment); Klayman, 957 F. Supp.2d 1,30-31 (D.D.C.2013) (recognizing plaintiff had
reasonable expectation of privacy).
122 See Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 756-57 (emphasizing importance of reasonableness with
Fourth Amendment); Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 30-31 (recognizing plaintiff had reasonable
expectation of privacy).
123 See Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 29-42 (analyzing plaintiffs' reasonable expectations
of
privacy to cellular telephone metadata).
124 See Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 724; Klayman,957 F. Supp. 2d at 1.
125 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482-84 (2014) (discussing reasonable
expectation of privacy incellphones).
126 See id. at 2480-81 (discussing factual and procedural background).
127 Id. at 2480. Riley's cellular phone was a "smart phone," which has "advanced computing
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12
petitioner Brima Wurie after she made an apparent drug sale from a car. 1
The Court's analysis expanded upon the language of the Fourth
Amendment and the search and seizure exception in order to consider the
issue in the context of cellular phones. 129 In both cases the phone evidence
was entered as relating to a "search incident to the arrest" to "seize fruits or
evidence of crime." 3
However, a search could be exempt from the
warrant requirement if it meets the test that balances "the degree to which it
intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which
it is needed for the promotion of legitimate government interest."1 In this
case, the court held that the individual's privacy interests outweighed the
government's interest and therefore the search did not fall within this

capability, large storage capacity, and Internet connectivity." ld. The officer, concerned that
Riley was associated with the "Bloods" gang, searched the phone. ld. Riley attempted to
suppress all information obtained from the phone as a violation of the Fourth Amendment without
success. ld. at 2481. The infornation obtained from Riley's phone was key to establishing
Riley's association with the gang. See id.("Although there was 'a lot of stuff' on the phone,
particular files that 'caught [the detective's] eye' included videos of young men sparring while
someone yelled encouragement using the moniker 'Blood.' . . . . The police also found
photographs of Riley standing in front of a car they suspected had been involved in a shooting a
few weeks earlier ....At Riley's trial, police officers testified about the photographs and videos
found on the phone, and some of the photographs were admitted into evidence. Riley was
convicted on all three counts and received an enhanced sentence of 15 years to life in prison.").
121 Id. at 2481. This phone, unlike the first case, was a simpler "flip phone" that lacks the
advanced connectivity and capability. ld. The officers used a number off the phone to locate
Wurie's "home" and with a search warrant found "215 grams of crack cocaine, marijuana, drug
paraphernalia, a firearm and ammunition, and cash." ld.
129 See id. 2482-84 (discussing reasonable expectation of privacy in cellphones). The Fourth
Amendment has always been considered within the context of "reasonableness," and, thus, an
exception was created so law enforcement could have access to legitimate evidence of "criminal
wrongdoing." ld. at 2482. However, the scope of "reasonableness" is not always a clear answer.
ld. The Court outlined the "search incident to arrest trilogy" to flesh out the known boundaries of
the argument. ld. at 2483-84. The first case of the trilogy, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969), was the foundation for the doctrine and first articulated the justification for the exception.
Id. at 2483. A search could be justified "to protect officer safety or to preserve evidence." Id.
However, the Court cited to relevant limiting language to a search of "the arrestee's person and
the area 'within his immediate control."' ld. The second case, United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973), delved further into the scope of a "search of arrestee's person." Id. The Court
stated the authority to search does not depend on "the probability in a particular arrest situation
that weapons or evidence would in front be found." ld. (internal quotes omitted). Instead the
Court held a "custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion...
[consequently] a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification." Id. (internal
quotes omitted). Finally, in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), a specific exception was
established for "circumstances unique to a vehicle context." ld. at 2484. The Court held police
can search a car only "when an arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at time of the search." ld.
130 See Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2481-82 (addressing phone seizure in content of search incident to
lawful arrest).
131 See id. at 2478 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)) (describing
balancing test).
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exception. 13 2 The most interesting party of this decision is the Court's
reliance on a heightened protection for "smart phones" because of the
breadth of personal information available at your fingertips.133 The Court
goes into great length to discuss the "immense storage capacity," "element
of pervasiveness," and how the "cloud" has created limitless access to
devices far beyond the cell phone on the individual's person. 13 4 A phone
was analogized to being the equivalent of "lug[ging] around every piece of
mail they have received for the past several months, every picture they
'
have taken, or every book or article they have read."135
Additionally, there
were citations to studies that have measured cell phone ownership in the
United States, the proximity levels between the owners and their phone,
and the average number of "apps" installed on average. 136 Essentially, this
decision is peppered with references to studies, articles, and amicus briefs
filed by organizations, such as the Electronic Privacy Information Center
(EPIC), that demonstrate3 that there are significant privacy concerns when
1
considering cell phones.

VI. Voicemails and Marital Privileges
There is a strong argument to include voicemails within "private
112 See id. at 2485 (dictating holding of the case). The Court found United States
v.
Robinson inapplicable in the context of the "digital content of cell phones." ld. The data will not
harm an officer once it is removed from the person and it will not "effectuate the arrestee's
escape." ld. Further, the officer does not need to search into a phone to know "exactly what they
would find therein: data." ld. The Court also stated even with concerns with evidence
destruction there is no justification for accessing the cell phone until a warrant is secured. Id. at
2486. The Court held that when inspecting a cell phone there is a "substantial intrusion" on the
privacy of an individual. ld. at 2489. A search of a cell phone would be more exhaustive than
any other search particularly with the usage of "cloud computing." ld. at 2491. With "cloud
computing," infornation can be stored and accessed remotely and there is no way to determine
whether something is being accessed from the phone or the "cloud." ld. It was conceded by the
government that a search should not include files accessed remotely, but it could provide no
solution to this problem. Id.
133 See id. at 2489 ("[I]nspecting the contents of an arrestee's pockets works no substantial
additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest itself [and] may make sense as applied to
physical items, but any extension of that reasoning to digital data had to rest on its own bottom.").
134 See id. at 2489-91 (analyzing breadth of information accessible through cellular phones).
135 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (analyzing breadth of information accessible
through
cellular phones).
136 See id. at 2490 (analyzing breadth of information accessible through cellular phones).
The Court discusses applications for "managing detailed infornation about all aspects of a
person's life." ld. It points to "apps for alcohol, drug, and gambling addictions; apps for sharing
prayer requests; apps for tracking pregnancy symptoms," and so forth to reveal that cell phones
have no limitations when it comes to personal information. ld.
137 See id. at 2489-91 (citing to studies in EPIC's amicus brief when analyzing effect
and
breadth of cellular technology).
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conversations" when courts have acknowledged the heightened privacy
concerns for cell phones coupled with the language of marital privileges.138
As previously stated, the Supreme Court opines that a phone is no longer
solely a means of communication, but rather a single source for all
information regarding an individual's likes, dislikes, bank information,
reading habits, and other elements.13 9 While not widespread, many courts
are already140handling matters involving technology in the context of marital
privilege.
A. Prior Cases Regarding Voicemails
14 1
An earlier example can best be seen in Wong-Wing v. State,
where a marital privilege was invoked regarding a message on an
answering machine, similar to a voicemail. 142 In this case, the defendant
was convicted of sexually abusing his ex-wife's daughter and the voice
143
message left on the machine was evidence of his state of mind.

However, the defendant did not invoke the marital communication
privilege until the case reached the appellate division. 144 The defendant
argued that since the message was "intended solely for his wife" this
communication was protected the trial court erred in admitting it. 145 While
the defendant failed to assert the privilege at the appropriate time, the court
still discussed the implications of the privilege applying to a message on an
answering machine. 14 6 The court held that since the message was left in a
138

See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494 (2014) (discussing voicemail); see also MassachusettsGuide

to Evidence, supra note 66, at 70 (discussing spousal disqualification).
139 See id. at 2490-91 ("[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government far
more than the most exhaustive search of a house[.]").
140 See Wong-Wing v. State, 847 A.2d 1206, 1208-10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (discussing
answering machine messages with marital privilege); Newell v. State, 49 So.3d 66, 67-71 (Miss.
2010) (discussing voicemail messages with marital privilege).
141 847 A.2d 1206 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004).
142 See id. at 1208-09 (summarizing facts of case).
143 Id. at 1209. The State introduced both the tape and the transcript into evidence.
ld. The
defendant had previously admitted to the mother that he had attempted to commit suicide. Id.
When the mother heard this message, she immediately contacted the police and the detective,
who proceeded to defendant's home with a warrant. ld.
144 See id. at 1210 (noting defense counsel did not invoke marital privilege at trial).
145 ld. "One spouse is not competent to disclose any confidential communication between
the spouses occurring during their marriage." MD. CODE CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-105 (West
2016). The element of confidentiality is further defined: "Communications between husband and
wife occurring during the marriage are deemed confidential if expressly made so, or if the subject
is such that the communicating spouse would probably desire that the matter be kept secret, either
because its disclosure would be embarrassing or for some other reason." Coleman v. State, 380
A.2d 49, 52 (Md. 1977) (citation omitted).
146 See Wong-Wing, 847 A.2d at 1212-13 (discussing defendants' unreasonable expectation

418

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXI

home shared by the mother, daughter, and the mother-in-law, the defendant
failed to meet the element of confidentiality. 14 There was no expectation
that this communication would remain confidential since there was a
possibility of someone other than his wife would receive the message from
a machine available to multiple family members. 14
Further, the
communication was not confidential in its nature because the defendant did
not offer evidence that stated otherwise at the trial court level. 149 The court
suggested the defendant could have met either element of confidentiality if
evidence had been presented regarding, "... the location of the answering
machine; who had access to it; or whether the answering
machine was the
1 50
recorded.
it
that
message
any
aloud
kind that broadcast
In a Mississippi court, the court was presented with voicemail
messages the defendant sought to exclude by the spousal privilege.1 51 In
this case, the defendant convinced his wife was unfaithful, called her and
left two voicemail messages on her cell phone. 15 2 In the first message he
threatened to kill her and her alleged lover, and then in the second message
he retracted his threat.1 53 Unfortunately, the defendant later went to
confirm his wife's infidelity and shot an individual during a struggle.1 54 In
an effort to prove his side of the story, the defendant demanded the police
seize his wife's phone to prove she was cheating.1 55 At this point, the cell
phone still contained the voicemail messages he had previously left. 156 The
wife willingly gave her cellular phone and her passcode to the police after
the police requested access to the messages.157
On the defendant's notice of appeal, he argued that the voicemail
messages should not have been admitted because they were subject to the
spousal privilege and the wife failed to meet the spousal competency

of privacy regarding answering machine message). At the trial court, defense counsel objected to
the tape not being "timely disclosed," which was overruled, and then requested that the transcript
be submitted instead of the recording. Id. at 1210.
147 See id. at 1212-13 (discussing defendants' unreasonable expectation of privacy
regarding
answering machine message).
148 See id. at 1213 (explaining defendant lacked reasonable expectation).
149 See id. (noting lack of other evidence proving expectation of privacy).
150 Wong-Wing, 847 A.2d. at 1213.
151 See Newell v. State, 49 So.3d 66, 70 (Miss. 2010) (explaining basis for appeals
filed by
Newell).
152 See id. at 68 (providing context).
153 See id. (describing both messages).
154 See id. at 69 (providing content for shooting).
155

See id.

156 See Newell, 49 So.3d at 70 (explaining basis for appealed filed by Newell).
157

Id. at 71.
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standard. 158
Once again, the defendant had to demonstrate the
159
communications were confidential in order for the privilege to apply.
The court disagreed with this argument because the husband threatened to
kill his wife in the voicemails. 160 However, excluding that exception,
confidentiality would not have been met because the threat would have
likely been communicated to the wife's lover or the police once the wife
heard the message. 161 More importantly, the spouses both waived the
privilege when the defendant instructed the police to check his wife's
phone for evidence and when the wife voluntarily gave her phone to the
police. 162 Therefore, while it clearly fell within an exception,
the court still
163
communications.
the
in
confidentiality
of
lack
analyzed the

158 See id.(detailing defendant's argument).

According to the spousal privilege, "[i]n
any

proceeding, civil or criminal, a person has a privilege to prevent that person's spouse, or former
spouse, from testifying as to any confidential communication between that person and that
person's spouse." MIss. R. EVID. 504(b). This privilege can be claimed by either spouse. Miss.
R. EVD. 504(c). According to the spousal competency rule, 'Jelvery person is competent to be a
witness except as restricted by the following: (a) In all instances where one spouse is a party
litigant the other spouse shall not be competent as a witness without the consent of both
Miss. R. EVID. 601.
159 See Newell, 49 So.3d at 71 (analyzing admissibility of defendant's voicemail messages
under "husband-wife privilege").
160See id. Similar to the Massachusetts spousal privilege, there are certain exceptions to the
privilege in cases such as when a spouse makes a verbal threat. Miss. R. EVID. 504(d).
According to the rule:
There is no privilege under this rule in civil actions between the spouses or in a
proceeding in which one spouse is charged with a crime against (1) the person of
any minor child or (2) the person or property of (i) the other spouse, (ii) a person
residing in the household of either spouse, or (iii) a third person committed in the
course of committing a crime against any of the persons described in (d)(1), or (2)
of this rule.
Id. These exceptions are in response to cases of domestic violence where there might be limited
evidence of abuse beyond what is offered by the battered spouse. Id.
161See Newell, 49 So.3d at 71 (discussing how threats would have made wife share
communication with another for her safety). The court explained regardless of the exception that
disqualifies threats to a spouse, the wife would likely have felt compelled to share this
communication with the police of her "lover" out of concern for her safety, which would mean
the communication was no longer confidential. ld.
162See id. (explaining both spouses waived the privacy element under Rules 504 and 601).
163See id.(reasoning 504 and 601 did not apply when defendant and wife surrendered phone
to police). The court did avoid holding whether the marital communications privilege applied,
but still explored, in dicta, the possibility of a confidentiality argument if there was no waiver and
these were not threats. Id.

420

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXI

B. Voicemails and Massachusetts Spousal Disqualification Rule
While other jurisdictions have not uniformly decided where
voicemails fall within spousal communications, the current language of
these decisions demonstrates a need to extend the spousal disqualification
rule to voicemails. 164 Looking at the spousal disqualification rule through
the elements required for a private conversation, a sufficiently strong
argument could be presented to protect a client's confidences.165
As apparent from case law, meeting the element of a private
conversation can be the most taxing hurdle for defendants because courts
are concerned whether the conversation is confidential in its nature and if
there is an intention for it to be confidential. 166 The Massachusetts courts
go beyond the federal courts by limiting conversations to those solely in the
presence of the other spouse, although case law does allow children to be
present if they are not sufficiently old enough or mature enough to
comprehend the conversation. 16
Therefore, similar to the analysis
suggested by the Wong-Wing court, cases will consider who had access to
the phone, whether the voicemails were heard6 in the presence of others, and
the security features within the phone itself. 1
However, current privacy arguments regarding cellular phones and
information regarding the mechanics of cellular phones demonstrate that
the nature of these conversations is meant to be private. 169 As stated in
Riley v. California, these phones, and therefore by default their voicemail
inboxes, cannot be compared to the traditional notions of a phone and an
answering machine. 1 70 The court compared cell phones to minicomputers

164 See Newell v. State, 49 So.3d 66, 71 (Miss. 2010) (finding threatening voicemails not
protected under spousal privilege); Wong-Wing v. State, 847 A.2d 1206, 1212 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2004) (holding messages lacked confidentiality for spousal communication to apply).
165See Massachusetts Guide to Evidence, supra note 66 (stating rule and elements of marital
privilege).
166See Commonwealth v. Burnham, 887 N.E.2d 222, 226-27 (Mass. 2008) (treating civil and
criminal proceedings together under spousal privilege rule); Gallagher v. Goldstein, 542 N.E.2d
53, 54 (Mass. 1988) (holding rule applies equally to both spouses); Commonwealth v. Cronin, 69
N.E.2d 1065, 1066 (Mass. 1904) (explaining while spouses willing to share conversation, not
allowed because bar by the rule); Schultz v. Gotlund, 542 N.E.2d 53, 53 (Mass. 1989) (describing
Massachusetts marital communications privilege).
167See supra Part IV.C (discussing element of privacy when in presence of children).
168See Wong-Wing, 846 A.2d at 1213 (discussing factors in message privacy).
169See Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2490-991 (2014) ("[A] cell phone search would
typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house[][.]");
Newell, 49 So.3d at 71 (finding threatening voicemails not protected under spousal privilege);
Wong-Wing, 847 A.2d at 1206 (holding messages lacked confidentiality for spousal
communication to apply).
170 See Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2485 (finding search of information on cell phone different from
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and cited data that "nearly three-quarters of smart phone users report being
within five feet of their phones most of the time.",171 Therefore, the public
has a greater need for and demand for privacy protection when it comes to
their cellular phones. 17 2 Further, cellular phones have passcodes to access
the main features of a phone and separate passcodes for the voicemail
inboxes themselves.1 3 While the Wong-Wing court was concerned that
universal access to answering machines, the same concerns cannot be
automatically assumed with a cellular phone because to have access would
require removing a phone from an individual's person and then entering a
private code. 174 It is unlikely that the a person, who statistically always has
a phone on his or her person, would leave the cellular phone unattended to
be picked up by an individual who also knew the code to access it. 1 5 For a
phone to be accessed by another individual means they
previously had
1
permission to do so or are doing so with other intentions. 76
Along with its private nature, it is also the intention of the sender to
leave a message solely for the owner of the cellular phone.1 77 The call and
message left was specifically to the spouse who owns phone.1 8 The phone
is essentially an extension of one's physical self, and thus, society can
make the reasonable assumption that calling the device correlates to an
attempt to reach the owner of the phone.1 7 9 A person no longer has to
dictate in a message the intended recipient because it is clear from the
number they chose to dial. 80 Therefore, it is clear whom the message is
intended for and, with the ubiquity of cellular phones, the person leaving
the message is also aware that the security features will protect this

physical search).
171 Id. at 2489.

172 See id. at 2490 (discussing vast uses of cell phones).
173 See Newell, 49 So.3d at 74 (describing advance features of a cellphone).
174 Compare Wong-Wing, 847 A.2d at 1213 (discussing expectation of privacy of answering
machines), with Newell, 49 So. 3d at 72 (explaining obtaining individual's cellphone for
evidential use).
175 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 ("According to one poll, nearly three-quarters of smart
phone users report being within five feet of their phones most of the time, with 12% admitting
that they even use their phones in the shower .... Today, by contrast, it is no exaggeration to say
that many of the more than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a
digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives from the mundane to the intimate.").
176 Id.

177 See Wong-Wing, 847 A.2d at 1212 (discussing relevancy of sender's intent when
determining confidentiality).
178 See Newell, 49 So.3d at 70 (discussing caller's intent).
179 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490-91 ("[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the
government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house[] [.").
180

Id. at 2489.
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information from reaching only the owner.18 1 The owner set up the
passcode and other security features of the phone to protect calls and
messages from the public eye. 18 2 When the owner and sender of the
voicemail message intended the inbox to be accessed solely by the intended
recipient likely there is an intention for confidentiality.183
VII. CONCLUSION
While marital privilege can appear to be an antiquated concept
rooted in outdated principles of marriage and status, both the state and
federal jurisprudence continue to support its usage. Particularly for private
marital communications, courts and legal organizations continue to
rationalize its purpose to protect the confidentiality between spouses at the
same level as other evidentiary privileges such as attorney-client privilege
or psychotherapist-patient privilege. With no end in sight, it is necessary to
adapt it to the evolving world. A cellular phone, with its infinite
possibilities, is more than a method of contact. Therefore, it is not hard to
contemplate a society that reasonably assumes an expectation of privacy to
protect the data stored within a cellular phone. It can be surprising or
almost taboo for an individual to not have access to a cellular phone. As an
extension of one's self, the cellular phone is central to people's
relationships with clients, friends, relatives, and spouses. Even spouses
who share a home, a family, and a life each have a phone and private
conversations are not going to be limited solely to those face to face
interactions.
As the judicial system has acknowledged, our current
jurisprudence must adapt to a changing landscape.
Having phone
conversations, such as voicemails, not embraced by the privilege is denying
the evolution of communication. The courts in other instances embraced
the changing landscape of "traditional" marriage, "traditional" procreation,
and now must extend beyond "traditional" marital privilege.
CaterinaA. Sacchini

181 See id. at 2486-88 (discussing cellular telephone encryption).
182 See Newell, 49 So.3d at 71 (discussing privacy in messages).
183 See id. (discussing privacy in messages).

